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Green: Tax Consequences of Gifts Given with Strings Attached

NOTES
EDITOR'S NOTE: The following two student works present different treatments of the operation of section 677, an unsettled area of the law. In conjunction with section 671, section 677 attributes taxable income to the settlor
when trust income is used to pay the settlor's obligation on the transferred
property and when the settlor retains a reversionary interest or remains
primarily liable on the debt.
The first note, written by Richard Green, considers this aspect of section
677 within a broader treatment of the tax consequences of gratuitous
transfers. After briefly discussing the early case law development of the
statute's application to transfers of encumbered property, Green attempts
to reconcile diverse case law results with the underlying "retained income
interest" rationale of the statute. This rationale focuses on the operation of
the trust subsequent to the transfer. The author next discusses the assumption
by the trust of the settlor's gift tax liability, noting that despite the availability
of the part-sale, part-gifi treatment, a "net gift" analysis that results in
no attribution to the settlor has generally been followed. The author concludes by discussing the application of the part-sale, part-gift analysis to situations in which section 677 will not attribute income to the settlor. Under this
approach, the settlor would recognize gain to the extent that section 677 does
not attribute income if the assumption by the trust exceeds the settlor's
basis in the property transferred.
The second work, authored by Baird Lefter, concentrates on section 677's
limitations in detecting the appropriatetax consequences of those transactions
structured to avoid the attribution of trust income to the settlor. In general,
the section 677 cases that Green attempts to reconcile are treated by Lefter as
illustrations of the divergent tax consequences that result from differences
in the structure of the transfer in trust. Arguing that the underlying economic
reality of the transfer should be the critical factor, the analysis focuses on
the transfer rather than on the subsequent operation of the trust. The commentary concludes with a recommendation that the Commissioner, in order
to determine the appropriate consequences of the transaction, extend the
Crane doctrine and the part-sale, part-gift analysis to those situations in
which section 677 has been rendered inapplicable by tax planning or the
fortuitous structure of the transfer.

TAX CONSEQUENCES OF GIFTS GIVEN WITH STRINGS ATTACHED
The gratuitous inter vivos transfer of property may be subject to a tax
or have tax consequences. The most obvious tax, of course, is the gift tax.'
Such transfers, however, may also have other tax ramifications encompassing
2
both the income and estate tax areas.
1.

2.

INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§2501-24.
While this note will generally address the gift and income tax consequences of
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Although under common law a gift is a gratuitous inter vivos transfer,3
a conveyance need not be totally void of consideration to be treated as a
gift for gift tax purposes. 4 The consideration may be in the form of a direct
payment to the donor, or an assumption of the donor's liability, or the
donee's acceptance of the property subject to a liability. 5 As long as the payment or liability is less than the fair market value of the transferred property,
the transfer is considered a gift for gift tax purposes. 6 The gift tax consequences
of such transfers are generally well-settled.7 The income tax consequences of
such transfers, however, are not dearly defined and are currently the subject
8
of much litigation.
There are two areas in which the transfer may have income tax consequences. First, if the donee uses income generated by the transferred property
to pay the assumed liability, such income may, under certain circumstances,
be properly attributable to the donor.9 Second, if the liability assumed or to
which the gift property is subject exceeds the donor's basis in the property,
the Commissioner has asserted, with varying degrees of success, that the
transfer is part-sale and part-gift; thus, the excess of the liability over the
gifts given with strings attached, it will not include a discussion of the estate tax ramifications of such transfers.
3. Black's Law Dictionary defines gift as a "voluntary transfer of personal property
without consideration .

. .

. A parting by owner with property without pecuniary con-

sideration .... ." BLACK'S LAw DIcnOxNARY 817 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2512(b) states in part: "Where property is transferred
for less than adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, then the amount
by which the value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration shall be
deemed a gift ......
I
While
the section purports to deal only with the valuation of
gifts, it has been interpreted as expanding the gift tax concept of "gifts" to include
nongratuitous inter vivos transfers to the extent that the value of the transferred property
exceeds that value of the consideration received by the donor. Thus, while the forfeit
of a legal right by the "donee" may be sufficient consideration to enforce a contract to
transfer property, such consideration, if it is of no monetary value to the "donor," does
not remove the transfer from the status of a "gift" for gift tax purposes. Commissioner
v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 45-1 U.S.T.C. 10,179 (1945).
5. Where a liability is "assumed" the transferee becomes personally liable for the
debt. If, however, he takes property "subject" to a debt, the debt is a lien on the property,
but the transferee is not personally liable for the debt. See, e.g., Alabama-Florida Co. v. Mays,
111 Fla. 100, 149 So. 61 (1933); Klauser v. Rennen, 226 Wis. 305, 276 N.W. 356 (1937).
6. But cf. TREAS. REG. §25-2512-8, which states that "a sale, exchange, or other transfer
of property made in the ordinary course of business (a transaction that is bona fide, at
arms length, and free from any donative intent) will be considered as made for an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth." Id. This regulation, however, does
not necessarily suggests a contrary conclusion. Indeed, in a business setting the fair
market value of the transferred property is deemed to be equal to the payment of the
liability.
7. See, e.g., Sarah H. Harrison, 17 T.C. 1350 (1952), acquiesced in, 1952-2 CuM. BULL. 2;
Estate of Koert Bartman, 10 T.C. 1073 (1948), acquiesced in, 1948-2 CuM. BULL 1; Estate of
Sarah A. Bergan, 1 T.C. 543 (1943), acquiesced in, 1943 CuM. BULL. 2.
8. See, e.g., Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 106, 71-1 U.S.T.C. 9475 (N.D. Miss.
1971), aff'd per curiam, 455 F.2d 502, 72-1 U.S.T.C. 9217 (5th Cir. 1972); Edna Bennett
Hirst, 63 T.C. 307 (1974); Jack Wiles, 59 T.C. 289 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 74-1 U.S.T.C.
9379 (5th Cir. 1974).
9. See text accompanying notes 64-141 infra.
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donor's basis is income to the donor. ° While the two areas are clearly mutually
exclusive, it may be difficult to determine whether a given amount is properly
includible in the donor's gross income as an income interest in the transferred
property or as an amount realized on the sale of the property.11
The purpose of this note is to examine the nature and scope of the gift
and income tax consequences resulting from the donee's acceptance of obligations in conjunction with his receipt of the gift. Particular consideration is
given to the extent to which such obligations affect the amount of gift tax owed,
to the attribution to the donor of the income from the gift property that is or
could be used to pay the accepted obligation, and to the circumstances under
which the donor will have to recognize a gain on the transfer.
GIFT TAX CONSEQUENCES

The amount of gift tax imposed on any transfer depends on both the
value of the gift and the total value of past taxable gifts.' 2 Regarding value,
special considerations are involved when the "gift" is not entirely gratuitous.
The effect on the gift tax is generally well-settled when the donee makes a
payment to the donor, or accepts a liability of the donor, or takes the gift
property subject to a liability.
The amount of the "gift" is the value of the transferred property less the
liability,"a regardless of whether the liability is actually assumed or the
property is merely taken subject to it.

14

The value of the gift is reduced by

the amount of the liability because the liability is deemed either "consideration in money or money's worth"' 5 or a "retained interest" in the gift by the
donor. Under the consideration theory, the "gift" is the portion of the
transferred property not "paid for." Under the retained interest theory,
the donor retains ownership of a part of the property having a value equal
10. See text accompanying notes 142-168 infra.
11. If a taxpayer transfers income producing property that has a basis to him of
$800 and receives $1000 from the transaction (though the property is worth more), he
has (I) $1000 of income attributable to him as a retained income interest; or (2) $800
of returned capital and $200 of gain; or (3) a combination of income attributable to a
retained income interest (for example $100), returned capital ($800 or $1000 less the
income attributable to a retained income interest, whichever is lower), and gain ($1000
less the retained income interest and less the returned capital, which equals $100 when
the returned capital was $800, and the retained income interest was $100). The areas of
gain and attributable retained income are mutually exclusive - the taxpayer received
only $1000 from the transaction and will never have to recognize more than $1000 of
income.
12. The gift tax is a graduated tax, imposed quarterly. It is determined by computing
the amount of tax that would be due on the aggregate sum of the taxable gifts for the
present calendar quarter and all preceding calendar years and quarters and subtracting
from that amount the amount that would be due on the aggregate taxable gifts of
all past years and quarters. INT REV. CODE OF 1954, §2502(a). The effect is to increase the
rate of taxation of present gifts as the aggregate amount of gift increases.
13. See note 4 supra.
14. See note 5 supra.
15. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2512(b). For a discussion of the gift tax meaning of
consideration, see text accompanying note 31 infra.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1967

3

19761

Florida Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1967], Art. 4

ATTRIBUTION OF INCOME UNDER SECTION 677

to the liability. He is deemed to have transferred the rest of the property,
and only that part that is transferred is considered a gift.16 The theory
used, however, does not change the result for gift tax purposes' 7 since the
value of the gift under both theories is equal to the total value of "gift
property" less the amount of the liability. Many courts fail to state with
certainty the method of valuation employed, but this probably stems from
the fact that the result does not depend on the theory used. s
Under the retained-interest theory, only a portion of the property is considered actually to have been transferred. Since the gift tax is not a tax on
property, but an excise tax on its transfer, 19 only the portion of the property
transferred is taxable by the gift tax.20 The portion deemed transferred is
2
a common law gift since it was transferred without consideration. 1
An interest is retained to the extent the donor has not given up dominion
22
and control over the income from the property or the use of the property.
For example, if a settlor creates an irrevocable trust with an income interest
to himself for life and the remainder interest to someone other than his
estate, 23 he has made a complete gift of the remainder. He has not made a
16. Donor gives donee a house worth $100,000 but subject to a mortgage of $60,000.
Under the retained interest theory, the donor has retained ownership of a portion of the
house with a value equal to the liability (a 6/10 or a $60,000 interest in the house)
and has made a gift of the other 4/10 or a $40,000 interest in the house.
17. See, e.g., May T. Hrobon, 41 T.C. 476 (1964). In Hrobon the taxpayer had
attempted to "sell" her life interest to trust income for what the Tax Court found
to be a right to 60% of the trust income. The court found it necessary for income tax
purposes to determine whether the right to 60% of the trust income was "consideration"
for the transfer or whether she had retained the 60% interest and had given away the
40%. The court found that the taxpayer had retained 60% of the property and thus had
made a taxable gift of the 40% interest in the trust income. The court also found,
however, that had there been a finding that the taxpayer had sold her entire interest in the
trust income in return for a right to 60% of the trust income, she still would have been
considered to have made a gift of the 40% of the trust income since there was
only full and adequate consideration for 60% of the income interest. Id.
18. Terms such as "net transfer" give little hint of the theory used in determining
the "net" figure. In E.A. Hayes, 11 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 42,232 (1942), the issue concerned
the sufficiency of consideration for a transfer of property. The court first had to determine
the value of the property transferred. It found the value of the transferred property to
be $1,083,283.19 less the value of the debts assumes by the donee of $586,927.40 for a "net
value" of $496,355.79. Id. at 578-42. While it is not dear what theory the court used
in finding the net value, it is arguable that since the court later found sufficient consideration for the $496,355.79 "net transfer," the assumption by the donee of the debts of
$586,927.40 must have been something other than consideration, i.e., a retained interest by
the donor.
19. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §2501(a)(1); TREAs. REG. §25.2511-1(a).
20. See Sarah H. Harrison, 17 T.C. 1350 (1952), acquiesced in, 1952-2 Cum. BULL 2.
21. See note 3 supra.
22. ThRAs. REG. §25.2511-2(a). See Stern v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 376, 70-1 U.S.T.C.
12,640 (E.D. La. 1970) (alternative holding), afl'd on other grounds, 436 F.2d 1327, 71-1
U.S.T.C. 12,737 (5th Cir. 1971).
23. For gift tax purposes, a person and his estate are considered to be the same person.
TREAs. REG. §25.2511-2(d). This is in sharp contrast with the apparent rule in the
related field of estate taxes. See United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627, 66-1 U.S.T.C.

1i12,388 (1966) ...
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gift to the extent of the value of his retained income interest.2 4 The taxpayer,
however, has the burden of proving the value of the interest retained to
determine the amount by which the value of the gift is reduced.2 5 Obviously,
to reduce the amount considered to be transferred by gift, the interest re26
tained must be susceptible of valuation.
A more complex example of a retained interest is a gift of a piece of
property, such as a house, in conjunction with an agreement by the donee
to pay an obligation of the donor, such as a debt secured by a mortgage.
The donor may be deemed to have retained an interest in the gift property
equal to the value of the obligation. 27 Thus, under the retained-interest
theory, if a gift is made of a $100,000 house, subject to a $20,000 debt secured
by a mortgage on the house, the donor has made a gift of an $80,000 interest
in the house and has retained a $20,000 interest in the house. The retained
interest terminates upon the payment of the debt by the donee.
Under the consideration theory, the value of the gift is the value of
transferred property less the value of any consideration in money or money's
worth. 28 The donee's acceptance of a liability of the donor may be deemed
consideration for the transfer; 29 however, it should be noted that consideration for gift tax purposes is a much narrower term than consideration in a
contract context.30
For purposes of the gift tax, consideration is limited to an asset capable
of evaluation in monetary terms or the assumption of an obligation of the
donor that, had it remained unpaid until it became a debt against the
donor's estate, would have been allowed as a deductible claim in computing
the donor's gross estate for estate tax purposes.31 The policy is to treat a
24. TREAS. REC. §25.2511-2(b).
25. Minnie E. Deal, 29 T.C. 730 (1958) (remainder interest valued at full value
of amount transferred in trust since taxpayer failed to prove value of her retained
income interest).
26. Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184, 43-1 U.S.T.C. %10,014 (1943). But cf. Commissioner v. Maresi, 156 F.2d 929, 46-1 U.S.T.C. 10,276 (2d Cir. 1946) (in estate tax
context, debt found susceptible of valuation despite failure of facts to fall squarely within
existing actuarial tables).
27. See note 16 supra.
28. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2512(b). See note 4 supra.
29. Estate of Sarah A. Bergan, I r.C. 543 (1943), acquiesced in, 1943 Cum. BULL. 2.
Cf. Sarah H. Harrison, 17 T.C. 1350 (1952), acquiesced in, 1952-2 CuM. BULL. 2.
30. Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 45-1 U.S.T.C. 10,179 (1945). In Wemyss
a woman's right to trust income terminated if she remarried. The taxpayer promised to set
up another trust for her with the same amount of income if she would marry him. On
fulfilling his promise, the taxpayer claimed that he had not made a gift since the
transfer was consideration for her agreement to marry him and give up her legal
right to the trust set up by her first husband. The Supreme Court concluded that
this was not consideration in the gift tax sense as it had no pecuniary value to the
taxpayer. Id.
31.

R.

STEPHENS,

G. MAXFIELD, & S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION

9-56

(3d ed. 1974). Accord, Commissioner v. Converse, 163 F.2d 131, 47-2 U.S.T.C. 10,567 (2d
Cir. 1947). The Converse court stated that: "Where, as here, there was the discharge of a
money judgment which, had it remained unpaid until it became a debt against the
respondent's estate, would have been allowed as a deductible claim in computing an
estate tax, the transfer which discharged that dobt during the respondent's life, is not
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transfer as a gift only to the extent that the donor's estate is depleted
by the transfer. This policy is consistent with the idea that gift tax complements the estate tax.
Nevertheless, an exchange of property in the ordinary course of business
is not a gift.32 Since an act done in the ordinary course of business is assumed
to have been done for self-interest, it may be further assumed that there has
been sufficient consideration in money or money's worth for the transfer. The
Commissioner defines a transfer in the ordinary course of business as a
transaction that is bona fide, at arm's length, and free from donative intent.33
If the donee assumes a liability owed by the donor to the donee, the
assumption of the liability is in fact a cancellation of the debt. Furthermore,
if the debt remained a liability until it became a claim against the donor's
estate and would have been deductible in determining the estate tax upon
the donor's death, 34 the cancellation of the debt is consideration in money or
money's worth for the transfer of property. 35
Money Judgments
One area that has engendered controversy as to what constitutes consideration in a gift tax context concerns the rendering of money judgments.
Generally, a money judgment is a deductible expense against an estate,38
and its satisfaction is normally deemed consideration in money's worth.

taxable as a gift. On the contrary it was the payment of a liquidated debt created by the
judgment and the discharge thereby of the respondent's obligation to pay that debt was
an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth for the transfer." 163 F.2d
at 133, 47-2 U.S.T.C. fl0,567, at 769 (2d Cir. 1947). INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2053(a), allows
an estate tax deduction for claims against the estate. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §2055(c), however, limits such deductions to bona fide contracts supported by full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth. Therefore, when an obligation is not based upon
an agreement, it is still deductible from the gross estate even though not supported by
consideration of money or money's worth. The Converse court used this reasoning to
conclude that the judgment in that case was therefore deductible from the gross estate.
32. See, e.g., Stem v. United States, 436 F.2d 1327, 71-1 U.S.T.C. 12,737 (5th Cir.
1971) (donation to candidate whose proposed policies seen as advantageous to donor's
business interests was deemed to be full and adequate consideration in money or money's
worth); Elizabeth C. Morrow, 2 T.C. 210 (1943) (purchase of promised annuity for retiring employee held to be additional compensation for past services); Irma Lampert, 15
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. J21,963 (1956) (transfer to donor's children in settlement of a lawsuit
against donor was deemed a transfer for full and adequate consideration).
33. TREAs. REG. §25.2512-8. Cf. Estate of Gertrude Friedman, 40 T.C. 714 (1963),
acquiesced in, 1964-2 Cums. BULL. 5.
34. What is deductible from the estate for estate taxes is generally beyond the
scope of this note. It will be noted, however, that a claim against the estate founded on a
promise is not deductible unless it was contracted in good faith and for full and adequate
consideration in money or money's worth. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §2043(b). It should be
noted that the release of support rights may constitute a consideration in money or
money's worth. E.T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. BULL. 166.
35. See note 31 supraand accompanying text.
36. See Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106, 50-2 U.S.T.C. I0,786 (1950); Commissioner
v. Converse, 163 F.2d 133, 47-2 U.S.T.C. J10,567 (2d Cir. 1947).,

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol28/iss3/4

6

Green: Tax Consequences of Gifts Given with Strings Attached
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. XXVIII

Some courts, however, have departed from this rule when determining
whether the satisfaction of the judgment is consideration for a transfer.5 7
For example, in Rosenthal v. Commissioner,38 the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals disregarded an enforceable judgment against the taxpayer and
found that the transfer was based on a voluntary promise to pay.39 The
court's rationale was that since a divorce-decree provision making awards
to children beyond their needs for support during minority is enforceable
only when based upon a contractual agreement, 40 a claim against the donor's
estate would not be based on a judgment but rather on an agreement. A
debt based on agreement must be for full and adequate consideration in
money or money's worth to be a deductible claim against an estate. 41 The
Rosenthal court concluded that the discharged debt was not based on an
agreement made for a full and adequate consideration. Thus, the debt discharge involved no reciprocal exchange of money or money's worth 42 and
was treated as a gift with the attendant gift tax consequences. Two prior
cases, Commissioner v. Converse43 and Harris v. Commissioner,44 had held
37. Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 505, 53-2 U.S.T.C. 10,908 (2d Cir. 1953);
Commissioner v. Greene, 119 F.2d 383, 41-1 U.S.T.C. 10,048 (9th Cir. 1941). In Greene
the Ninth Circuit took an extreme position. California law imposed on parents a duty to
support indigent children even after they reach majority. A state court approved a
transfer from the estate of an incompetent to her adult children for their support.
Ignoring state court approval of the transfer and the state imposed obligation, the
Greene court found the transfer was essentially donative and thus was a taxable gift. The
court argued that "[n]othing in the act expressly states that the existence of consideration
is to be determined by state law." 119 F.2d at 385, 41-1 U.S.T.C. 10,048, at 10,258. Although that statement is true, the federal concept of consideration generally includes the
cancellation of an obligation imposed by a state on a taxpayer during his lifetime. See
note 31 supra and accompanying text; text accompanying notes 34-35 supra. State law is
the only source for such an obligation. Although Greene is of questionable precedential value,
it does illustrate the propensity of the courts to impose the gift tax on anything that looks
like a gift.
38. 205 F.2d 505, 53-2 U.S.T.C. 10,908 (2d Cir. 1953). In Rosenthal, the taxpayer had
entered into a separation agreement with his wife that contained a series of provisions
for education, care, and support for his two children. The provisions included support
for the children after they reached majority. The agreement was adopted as part of a
divorce decree. The taxpayer later sought to amend the separation agreement by consolidating the annual payments to the children into one funded payment. The Commissioner argued that funding trusts for the purpose of supporting children of majority
age was a gift. The taxpayer argued that the transfer was in discharge of an obligation
arising from a divorce decree and was therefore full and fair consideration in money's
worth. Id. at 506-07, 53-2 U.S.T.C. 10,908, at 48,822-24.
39. Id. at 508, 53-2 U.S.T.C. 10,908, at 48,825.
40. Id.
41. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2053(c).
42. 205 F.2d at 508, 53-2 U.S.T.C. 10,908, at 48,825.
43. 163 F.2d 131, 47-2 U.S.T.C. 10,567 (2d Cir. 1947). The taxpayer in Converse had
contested the amount and form of payments to his wife in the divorce suit. The divorce
decree incorporated an earlier separation agreement but altered the form of the payments to one single large payment. The taxpayer successfully argued the payment was in
satisfaction of a judgment and thus was made for full and adequate consideration in
money's worth. Id. at 132, 47-2 U.S.T.C. 10,567, at 768-69. See note 31 supra.
44. 340 U.S. 106, 50-2 U.S.T.C. 10,786 (1950). In Harris the taxpayer and her husband
entered into an agreement for settlement of their property rights conditioned on the
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that satisfaction of a judgment was consideration within the meaning of
the gift tax. The Rosenthal court distinguished these decisions on the ground
that in Rasenthal, the duty to pay was in reality based on an agreement
made -with donative intent rather than a judgment.
Regardless of the theory employed, when the donee assumes an obligation
of the donor that is not an encumbrance on the transferred property, the
amount of the gift is the value of the transferred property less the amount
of the obligation accepted. The amount of the gift when the property is
encumbered may be determined using this rule, but the nature of the
liability should be examined.45 When the gift property is encumbered, but
the donor is not, personally liable for the debt, the gift is the donor's equity
in the property." A similar result is reached if the donor is personally liable
for the debt, but the donee cannot force the donor to pay the debt either
because no recourse against the donor is provided by state law-7 or because
the donor is insolvent at the time of the gift. In both situations, the amount
of the gift is the donor's equity since the equity equals the total value of
the transferred property less the amount of the obligation. A different result
is reached if the donor is personally liable for the obligation, and the donee
may under state law either force payment of the debt by the donor or become
subrogated to the creditor's rights upon payment of the debt. In this situation
there is no assumption of the debt, and the gift is the full value of the
49
transferred property without regard to the encumbrance.
Gift Tax Liability
While generally the same rules apply when the liability accepted is the
gift tax, the consequences of accepting such a liability affects the amount
entry of a divorce decree in a pending suit. The agreement was incorporated in the
divorce decree. Both the agreement and the decree provided that the agreement should
survive the decree. Id. Therefore, the Commissioner argued that the stttlement was based both
on the decree and on an agreement. Since it was based on an agreement not supported by
consideration, the settlement was a gift. It should be noted that this decision preceded the
enactment of INT. Rnv.

CODE OF

1954, §2516, which statutorily determines certain property

settlements to be transfers for a full and adequate consideration in money or money's
worth. Nevertheless, the court rejected the argument and held that the transfer was based
on the divorce decree, although at a later time the proper remedy for enforcement might
be contractual rather than a proceeding in contempt.
45. R. STEPHENs, G. AfAXIELD, & S. LiND, supra note 31, at 9-40 to 9-43.
46. Id. at 9-40; D.S. Jackman, 44 B.T.A. 704 (1941).
47. R. SEPr'ENs, G. MAxmLD, & S. Luw, supra note 31, at 9-41. But cf. Moore v. Commissioner, 146 F.2d 824, 45-1 U.S.T.C. 10,167 (2d Cir. 1945) (gift tax eventually paid
by the donee did not reduce amount of gift). Moore, however, is distinguishable since the
amount of the gift is established at the time of the gift. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §2512(a).
At the time of the gift, the debt was enforceable against the donor, and only subsequent
events (the running of a statute of limitations) made the debt uncollectible against the
donor. 146 F.2d at 824, 45-1 U.S.T.C. Il0,167, at 11,233-34.
48. Fred G. Gruen, I T.C. 130 (1942) (donee's transferee liability for income tax of
donor, incurred because transfer made donor insolvent, held to reduce amount of gift
Uy, amount of liability).
49. R. STrPHENs, G. MAXnrL, & S. LiND, supra note 31, at 9-40.
-
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of the liability. Ordinarily, the gift tax liability is the donor's.5 Although
the donee is secondarily liable for the tax and takes subject to the tax, the
value of the gift is not reduced by the amount of the gift tax.5' In contrast,
the acceptance of the gift tax liability by the donee reduces the amount of
the gift and thus reduces the amount of gift tax due. 52 This reduction does
not depend on the theory used since in this instance, as in other situations,
the retained-interest theory5 3 and the consideration theory54 lead to the
same result. Nevertheless, the assumption of the gift tax does have one consequence that is not present in the assumption of other liabilities because the
assumption of the gift tax liability ultimately affects the value of the gift. In
computing the gift tax, a circular process is initiated wherein the gift is
reduced by the amount of the gift tax liability, which in turn decreases the
amount of the gift tax liability, which increases the amount of the gift ad
infinitum. A mathematical formula is needed to compute the tax due, and
the Commissioner provides the formula in Revenue Ruling 71-232. 55
While the amount of tax due is reduced at the time of the gift when
the donee assumes the gift tax liability, the reduction alone does not justify
requiring the donee to pay the tax. Rather the tax is reduced because the gift
is reduced by the amount of the tax due. Assuming a cash gift, the same
result is reached by reducing the gift by the amount of gift tax. The tax then
to be paid by the donor would be the amount by which the gift had been
reduced.56 There may, however, be other reasons for having the donee pay
the gift tax. 57 The gift may not be easily liquidated, and the donor may
50. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2502(d).
51. See note 47 supra.
52. Pamela N.W. Lingo, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 20,323 (1954); Sarah H. Harrison,
17 T.C. 1350 (1952), acquiesced in, 1952-2 CUM. BULL. 2. Both cases are based on the retained
interest theory.
53. See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
54. See text accompanying notes 28-31 supra.
55. Rev. Rul. 71-232, 1971-1 CUM. BULL. 275. The formula supplied by the Commissioner is tentatixe tax/i plus rate of tax = true tax. The revenue ruling explains
the formula with examples, including one that explains how to determine the true tax
when there is a change in the tax bracket after calculating the tentative tax.
56. Assume that the donor, having made no gifts in preceding years, has this
quarter made a gift of $150,000 cash to a donee who agrees to pay the resulting gift
tax. Assume further that on his gift tax return, the donor will claim an annual exclusion
of $3,000.00 and his specific exemption of $30,000.00. The gift tax due will be $15,795.92,
and the donee will have $134,204.08 of the gift left after the gift tax is paid. See Rev. Rul.
71-232, 1971-1 CUM. BULL. 274. If instead, the same donor had made a gift of $134,204.08
to the donee, the donee would have the same amount as in the original fact situation.
If the donor claims the $3,000.00 annual exclusion and the $30,000.00 specific exemption,
he will have taxable gifts of $101,204.08. The gift tax on that amount is $15,795.92, the
same amount that would have been paid by the donee in the original fact situation. The
donor's total amount transferred is $134,204.08 gift plus $15,795.92 tax or $150,000.00 the
same amount he transferred originally.
57. See Rief, Donee-Paid Gift Tax: Some Considerations, 58 A.B.A.J. 1325 (1972). This
is an excellent article in general, although there have been some developments in this
area since it was written. Unfortunately, the author fails to emphasize that the reason
less gift tax is paid when the donee pays it is that the donee has received a smaller
or less valuable gift.
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not have sufficient cash to pay the tax.58 If part of the gift is to be
sold to pay the tax, there may be income tax advantages in having that
portion sold by a donee in a lower income tax bracket. 59 This advantage is
limited somewhat by the donor's obligation to recognize a gain for income
tax purposes if the tax liability assumed exceeds the donor's basis.60
For the gift to be reduced by the amount of the gift tax, the agreement
that the donee is to pay the tax must be made at the time of the gift; a
later agreement will not suffice. 61 This is a proper result since the value
of the gift is set at the time of the gift.62 Furthermore, if the donee pays
amount of the gift
the tax only because the donor has failed to do so, the
3
is not reduced by the amount of the gift tax liability.
INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES

Gifts given with strings attached 64 may have income tax as well as gift
tax considerations. For income tax purposes the retained-interest and consideration theories arguably should be applied to gift situations in the following ways. If the assumption of the donor's liability is deemed consideration
for the transfer, the donor, under the rules applicable to part-sale and partgift transactions, should recognize a gain to the extent that the liability
assumed exceeds his adjusted basis in the transferred property. 5 An exception to this rule is a "bargain sale" that allows the donor a deduction for a
charitable contribution. 66 In such a situation, the basis of the property is
allocated between the portion donated and the portion "sold,"67 and the
58. Id. at 1325.
59. Id.
60. See text accompanying notes 142-68 infra.
61. Estelle May Affelder, 7 T.C. 1190 (1946) (disallowing a reduction of the amount
of the gift by the amount of gift tax since donee-trustee was designated to pay the
tax after the transfer had already been made).
62. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §2512(a).
63. Moore v. Commissioner, 146 F.2d 824, 45-1 U.S.T.C. I10,167 (2d Cir. 1945). See
note 47 supra. The Moore result is probably correct, although the court used fallacious
reasoning. The decision predates any successful attempt to reduce the amount of the
gift by the amount of gift tax paid by the donee. See Pamela N.W. Lingo, 13 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 20,323 (1954); Sarah H. Harrison, 17 T.C. 1350 (1963). The Moore court
noted that an algebraic formula would be needed to compute the tax, and "algebraic
formulae are not lightly to be imputed to legislators." 146 F.2d at 826, 45-1 U.S.T.C.
110,167, at I1,25, quoting Edwards v. Slocun, 287 F. 651, 1 U.S.T.C. 172 (2d Cir. 1923).
The Moore court's holding was too broad since it indicated that the donee-paid gift tax
never reduced the amount of the gift. The case should be limited to its facts. When the
donee pays the gift tax, but neither agreed to do so at the time of the gift nor knew
he would have to because of the insolvency of the donor, the gift for gift-tax purposes is not
reduced by the amount of the gift tax.
64. A "gift given with strings attached" in the context of this note means a gift taken
subject to an obligation of the donor or a gift given with the understanding that the
donee would assume an obligation of the donor or make payments to the donor. Since
the transfer is still referred to as a gift, it is assumed that the transferred property has a
fair market value greater than the amount of the obligation or the payments.
65. See TaR.ms. Rxo. §1.1001-1(e).
66. See TREAs.REo. §1.170A-4(c)(2).
67. INT. REv. CODE oF' 1954, §170; TREAs. REo. §1.170A-4(c)(2).
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gain is computed by subtracting the basis allocated to the portion sold from
the amount realized.6 8 If the donor is deemed to have retained an income
interest in the gift property, the income from such an interest would be
taxable to the donor.6 9 Likewise, if the donor has retained ownership of any
of the underlying property, any income produced by that property would
be attributable to the donor. 70 If the donor's retained interest terminates
upon the complete satisfaction of his liability from trust income, it would
be inequitable to make the settlor recognize a further gain upon the termination of his interest since under one of the preceding retained-interest theories
the donor would have been taxed on the income used to pay his debt. 71

When the donor is deemed to have retained an interest in the property,
but that interest terminates on the payment of his debt by the donee with
income that is not attributable to the donor, he should recognize a gain on
the sale of his retained interest to the extent the liability exceeds his adjusted
basis in the retained interest.72 Under those circumstances, there would be
no consideration for the transfer until the obligation was paid. 73

68. If a person has property with a basis of $500 and a fair market value of $1,000, and
he "sells" the property to a charity for $500, intending to claim a charitable contribution,
the transaction is viewed as if there had been two transactions. The two transactions are a
gift of one-half the property with a basis of $250 and a fair market value of $500 and a
sale of the other half of the property for $500, that half also having a $250 basis.
The result is a $500 charitable gift and a $250 taxable gain.
69. See May T. Hrobon, 41 T.C. 476 (1964). The taxpayer argued that the income
she received was "consideration" for the transfer. She wished to treat her income as
capital gain rather than ordinary income. The Tax Court, however, found that the taxpayer
had retained an income interest in the property and that the income was characterized
as ordinary. For the facts of the case, see note 17 supra.
70. If the donor has retained an interest in the underlying property without retaining
the income interest, the situation is an attribution of income controlled by Helvering v.
Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 40-2 U.S.T.C. 9787 (1940). If, however, the donor is deemed to have
retained an interest in the underlying property and the resulting income interest, then
there is no need to resort to the Horst decision in order for the income from the retained
interest to be considered part of the donor's gross income.
71. The interest would end because it was a limited interest terminable on the
happening of an event: the satisfaction of the donor's debt. There would be no consideration for the termination of his interest since the income used was his income, either
because his interest was merely an income interest or because the income was attributable
to him since he retained the underlying property. See note 70 supra.
72. For example, if the donor owned property worth $40,000 with a basis of $20,000
and conveyed an undivided three-fourth's interest to the donee, but retained an undivided
one-fourth interest to be transferred to the donee upon the donee's payment of a $10,000
debt of the donor, the donor's basis in the one-fourth interest would be $5,000. If the
donor's interest in the property terminated and transferred to the donee on the donee's
payment of the debt, the donor should recognize a $5,000 gain on the transfer ($10,000
amount realized less $5,000 basis). Note that had the part-sale, part-gift theory been used
instead, the donor would have recognized no gain since the amount realized ($10,000) was
less than the adjusted basis in the transferred property ($40,000). See TREAS. REG. §1.1001-1
(e).
73. If the consideration is deemed to have been received at the time of the transfer,
then the "sale" would be complete and there would be no retained interest. See text
accompanying note 74 infra.
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An argument can be made, however, that the total transaction is a partsale and part-gift and should be treated as such under the applicable rules.
Unaer this theory, the consideration is either the assumption of the debt. or
the taking subject to a liability and it is received when the transfer occurs.
The donor would then recognize a gain only to the extent that the liability
assumed by the donee exceeded the adjusted basis in the entire transferred
property. 74 Although the courts have not always agreed with the foregoing
theories, they have nevertheless failed to develop any alternative analyses.
Income From Trust DischargingLiability
When the transfer is to a trust and income from the transferred property
is to be used to pay the donor's obligation, section 677,75 in conjunction with
section 671,76 provides that the donor has retained an interest sufficient to
attribute to him the income that is used or that could be used to pay his
liability.7 7 The same was true of section 677's predecessors.71 These provisions
may be viewed as a legislative determination to apply the retained-interest
theory in the trust situation.
While the apparent intent of section 677 and its predecessors is to attribute
to the grantor trust income used for his benefit, the courts initially narrowly
construed its provisions. The Supreme Court in Douglasv. Willcutts79 utilized a
74. See TREAs. REG. §1.1001-1(e). But cf. TREAS. REG. §1.170A-10 (bargain sales to
charities).
75. INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §677.
76, Ira. RiEv. CODE OF 1954, §671.
77. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §677 provides in part: "(a) GENERAL Rur.E- The Grantor
shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust . . . whose income without the
approval or consent of any adverse party, or, in the discretion of the grantor or a nonadverse party, or both, may be - (1) distributed to the grantor .... " Income is distributed
to the donor if it is distributed to his creditors. Douglas v. Willcutts, 296 US. 1, 36-1
U.S.T.C. 9002 (1935); Shanley v. Bowers, 81 F.2d 13, 36-1 U.S.T.C. 19069 (2d Cir. 1936)
-(dicta); John T. McLane, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 116,584 (1948). Trust income that may
be used to pay the donor's debt is attributable to the donor under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§671, which provides in part: "Where it is specified in this subpart that the grantor . . .
shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust, there shall then be included in
computing the taxable income and credits of the grantor . . . those items of income,
deductions, and credits against tax of the trust which are attributable to that portion
of the trust ...." The two sections taken together thus provide that income is attributable
to the donor. Reference hereinafter to income "attributable to donor under INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, §677" refers to that section taken in conjunction with §671.
78. The earliest predecessor of §677 was enacted as Revenue Act of 1924, §219(h).
That section remained substantially unchanged until the enactment of the 1954 Code.
There were two modifications in the section when it was enacted as INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§677. First, the section was reworded. See note 77 supra. Second, it did not directly
attribute trust income to the grantor if it was used for his benefit; instead, it attributed
to the grantor a retained ownership of that portion of the trust corpus from which the

income was attributable Section 671 attributes to the grantor the income from .that portion
of a trust owned by the grantor. Thus, §677 specifically uses the retained interest theory,

although -its predecessors only impliedly used that theory.
79. 296 U.S. 1, 36-1 U.S.T.C. 19002 (1935). The taxpayer set up a trust with income
of $15,000 per year to his wife from 1923 until 1927, and $21,000 thereafter. Excess income
was to be paid to the taxpayer, and on the death of his wife he was' to. receive the
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broad definition of gross incomeo in attributing to the grantor of a trust
income used to pay his obligation.8 1 It reasoned that the payment of the
settlor's debt by the trust was substantially the same as the settlor's receiving
the income personally and paying the debt himself.82 Although it did not
squarely face the issue, the Court apparently believed that the use of trust
income to pay a settlor's debts was not a sufficient reservation of income
under the statute.8 3 Another way to attribute income to the settlor was
thought necessary,8 4 and attribution under the definition of gross income
was found to be appropriate.
Other decisions extending the Willcutts holding quickly followed. 5 In
Helvering v. Blumenthal,s- the Supreme Court attributed to the settlor trust
income used to pay a debt of the settlor, despite the fact that the debt was
secured by property given in trust and that the trust property would have
been sold to satisfy the debt if the debt had not been paid by the trust. The
taxpayer argued that the payment of the debt was of no benefit to her. Since
sufficient trust property could be sold to pay the debt, it was unnecessary to
hold her liable.87 The rationale behind the holding is unknown since the
Supreme Court merely cited Wiltcutts and reversed per curiam the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals' decision, but the result does seem correct. The

property free of the trust. The trust was in lieu of alimony and all dower rights. The
agreement to set up the trust was incorporated in a later divorce decree. Id.
80. The definitions of gross income discussed in Revenue Act of 1926, §213, and
Revenue Act of 1928, §22, are essentially the same as the present definition of gross income,
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §61.
81. The obligation involved was in the nature of alimony. 296 U.S. at 8, 36-1 U.S.T.C.
9002, at 9204. Today the taxpayer would still have to recognize the income, but the

alimony payment would be deductible.

INT. REV. CODE

OF

1954, §215.

82. 296 U.S. at 9, 36-1 U.S.T.C. 19002, at 9206.
83. 296 U.S. at 10,36-1 U.S.T.C. 9002, at 9206. This view might be sustained under a
strict construction of the statute. Section 677 refers to income that may be distributed to
the grantor. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §677. It matters little, however, whether income is
included under §677 or under §61, except that §677 attributes income that may be distributed.
A broader interpretation of §677's predecessor may thus have been deemed desirable. The
two predecessors of §677 that were involved were Revenue Act of 1926, §219(h) and Revenue
Act of 1928, § 167. See note 78 supra.
84. 296 U.S. at 10, 36-1 U.S.T.C. %9002, at 9206.
85. Helvering v. Schweitzer, 296 U.S. 551 (1935), rev'g per curiam Commissioner v.
Schweitzer, 75 F.2d 702, 35-1 U.S.T.C. %9163 (7th Cir. 1935); Helvering v. Blumenthal,
296 U.S. 552 (1935), rev'g per curiam Blumenthal v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 507, 35-1
U.S.T.C. 9270 (2d Cir. 1935).
86. 296 U.S. 552 (1935), rev'g per curiam Blumenthal v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 507,
35-1 U.S.T.C. %9270 (2d Cir. 1935). The taxpayer had owned stock with a value of
$300,000. She pledged the stock to a bank on a loan of $75,000 and executed and delivered
a demand note. It was the bank's custom first to sell the stock in event of default in
payment before seeking to enforce payment against the maker of the note. The debt
to the bank was reduced to $33,000 by the date she transferred the stock. The taxpayer
conveyed all her rights to the stock, including unpaid accumulated dividends of $31,500
to a trust. The trust was to pay the remaining debt from the trust income. The issue was
whether the income used to pay the debt was attributable to the donor. 76 F.2d at 507,
35-1 U.S.T.C. %9270, at 9759.
87. 76 F.2d at 508, 35-1 U.S.T.C. %9270,at 9760.
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Willcutts Court had held that "income was received by a taxpayer when...
's
a debt or other obligation was discharged by another for his benefit." In
Blumenthal the taxpayer contended that the discharge was not for her
benefit because the debt was sufficiently secured by liens on the property
so that she would never be required to pay any of the debt. The discharge
arguably was not for the benefit of the settlor, but the debt had been incurred
for the settlor's benefit. Incurring had not been a taxable event, but its discharge was. This distinction is in harmony with the legislative intent that a
borrower should not be taxed on the loan proceeds unless the debt is paid
by another.8 9
The settlor's liability may be discharged either by its assumption by the
trust as consideration for the transfer or on its payment by the trust.90 If the
assumption or payment is not treated as consideration, the settlor is deemed
to have retained an interest in the property to the extent of the value of
the assumed liability.91 It is more reasonable to assume that when a settlor
creates a trust, he retains an interest in the trust property rather than that he
receives consideration from the trust for creating it. Thus, the holding of the
Blumenthal Court is probably correct. On the other hand, had the trust
sold or mortgaged property to satisfy the settlor's debt, the transaction would
92
have assumed more of the characteristics of a sale.

88. 296 U.S. at 9, 36-1 U.S.T.C. %9 002, at 9206 (emphasis added).
89. Cf. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 2 U.S.T.C. %814 (1931) (a
corporation was taxed on the difference between the price at which it had issued bondspar-and the price at which it redeemed the bonds-below par).
90. See text accompanying notes 142-168 infra.
91. If the settlor is deemed to have retained an interest in the trust property, either
the income prior to the discharge of the debt is attributable to him, or the discharge of
the debt is treated as consideration. If the discharge is deemed to be consideration, it is
consideration realized on a sale of the retained interest. Such consideration cannot be
consideration for a part-sale, part-gift transaction since the consideration for such a
transaction must be evidenced at the time of the transfer. See notes 71-74 surrd and
accompanying text.
92. Whether a given transfer to a trust in conjunction with the trust assuming or
taking subject to a debt is characterized as a part-sale, part-gift, transaction as a retention
of an income interest, or as a sale of a retained interest is presumably an issue of fact.
If a trust is created and the trust is to pay a debt of the settlor, it appears
that the settlor has not given the entire trust property but has retained part of it.
This is the reasoning behind §677.
If, however, the trust is to sell or mortgage property and use the proceeds to
extinguish the debt, the transaction takes on the attributes of a sale. If this "sale" takes
place at the time of the original transfer, the settlor must recognize a gain only to the
extent that the extinguished liability exceeds the basis of the entire transferred property
under the part-sale, part-gift rules. See note 65 supra and accompanying text. If the "sale"
takes place at a later time, gain should be recognized to the extent that the extinguished
liability exceeds the basis of the portion of the property retained. This computation
should be made in the same way that the basis of the property "sold" in a bargain sale
to a charity is computed. See notes 66-68 supra and accompanying text.
Although a distinction based on when the sale is made does not seem sound, the
fault lies with the part-sale, part-gift rules. The present rules benefit the taxpayer, but a
better approach would be to use the present charitable "bargain sale" rules in all cases..
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The holding of the Board of Tax Appeal in David Keith 93 is consistent
with the view that the donor received consideration when the trust satisfied
his debts with funds obtained by selling part of the trust corpus and borrowing
funds with trust corpus pledged as collateral. After paying the liability, the
trustees placed the trust income into a sinking fund to replenish the depleted
trust corpus. The Board, construing the preceding version of section 677, 94
95
held that income used in this manner was not attributable to the settlor.
While the Keith court did not specifically state that the payment of the debt
with borrowed funds was consideration for extinguishing the settlor's interest
in the property, the case suggests that conclusion. It is noteworthy that both
the preceding version of section 677 and the Willcutts decision96 were relied
on by the Commissioner, who apparently viewed Willcutts as an interpretation
of the income attribution section, despite language to the contrary.
The Tax court in Clifton B. Russell 97 once more broadly interpreted the
attribution provision by attributing to the grantor income that "may . . .be
distributed to the grantor,"9 8 rather than following the Willcutts Court's use
of the gross income section. 99 The taxpayer had created a trust with property
that secured a debt of the taxpayer; the debt was paid out of trust income
and from the proceeds of a loan from the taxpayer. The Tax Court held
that the borrowing of money by the trust to obtain funds to pay the debt
did not end the attribution of trust income to the settlor.10 0 Thus, Russell,
at first glance, refutes the argument that the sale or mortgage of trust property
to pay the debt of the donor is consideration for the transfer rather than a
retained interest in the trust. The money that the trust utilized to pay the
grantor's debt, however, was borrowed from the grantor, and the court
properly considered the transaction a sham that merely changed the form of
the grantor's retained interest. 01' This holding is therefore consistent with
Keith. The court also held that under the statute, the income applied to
the debt is attributable to the settlor even though an adverse party assents
to the use of the trust income to pay the debt.' ° 2 The court reached this
93.
94.
Act of
95.
96.
97.

45 B.T.A. 644 (1941), acquiesced in, 1942-1 CUM. BuLL. 10.
The sections construed by the board were Revenue Act of 1936, §167 and Revenue
1938, §167.
45 B.T.A. at 645, 646.
See notes 79-84 supra and accompanying text.
5 T.C. 974 (1945).

98. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §167 (now INT.

REV. CODE OF

1954, §677).

99. Later cases have tended to broadly interpret these sections and have even cited
Douglas v. Willcutts. See John Koehrer, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 14,408, at 220 (1945).
100. 5 T.C. at 983.
101. "While these trustees adopted the method of paying off $20,000 of the indebtedness
by borrowing $20,000 from petitioner and then repaying the $20,000 out of the income
of the trust, we think the substance of the transaction was that the original indebtedness
of $25,000 which existed against 350 shares of stock was paid out of the income of the
trust, and that appears to have been the intent of the petitioner when the trust indenture
was executed." Id. (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 982. If the adverse party's assent was necessary, the income would be
attributable to the adverse party, and that party would be viewed as making a gift to the

settlor.
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conclusion because the trust instrument did not require assent of an adverse
party in order for the trustee to use trust income to pay the debt.
The foregoing decisions attributed to the settlor the trust income that was
actually used to pay the settlor's debt. It should be noted, however, that
section 677 and its predecessors provide for attributing to the settlor the
income of the trust that could be distributed to him. 103 .Later cases held that
the amount attributable to the settlor when trust income may be used to pay
his debt is limited in any one year to the lesser of the amount of the
delnt or the amount of the income; it is not limited to the amount actually
used to pay the debt.-°
Blumenthal indicated that the taxpayer who receives the benefit of the
loan should thus be taxed on the income used to repay it, despite the
10 5
probability that he will never be held personally accountable for the debt.
Later decisions have held, however, that if the grantor is merely a surety for
the debt of the trust, the income used to repay such a debt is not attributable
to him."56 These later decisions can be reconciled with Blumenthal. If the
trust rather than the grantor receives the proceeds of the loan, there is no
reason for attributing the income to the grantor. The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, however, took a different position in the estate tax case of
Hays' Estate v. Commissioner.07 The court held that trust income cannot
be imputed to the settlor unless the settlor receives some pecuniary benefit
from having the debt paid; 08 nevertheless, it is important to note that the
Hays' Estate court was construing an estate tax provision. 10 9 Although the
103. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §167(a) (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §677).
104. Loeb v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 549, 47-1 U.S.T.C. 9112 (7th Cir. 1946); John
Koehrer, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. fr14,408 (1945).
105. See text accompanying notes 86-90 supra.
106. See Edwards v. Greenwald, 217 F.2d 632, 55-1 U.S.T.C. %9114 (5th Cir. 1954).
107. 181 F.2d 169, 50-1 US.T.C. %10,762 (5th Cir. 1950). Hays' Estate is an estate tax
case. It is discussed here because the inclusion of trust property in the settlor's estate
depended on whether trust income was used for the benefit of the settlor. Under estate
tax principles the settlor retained ownership of the res if she retained an income interest
in the property. The issue was thus identical to what it would have been in an income
tax proceeding.
In Hays' Estate the settlor conveyed income-producing land to herself as trustee
for the benefit of her four children and the heirs-at-law of any of the children who
died during the continuance of the trust. The conveyance was subject to certain mortgage
liens securing debts of approximately $36,000. The trustee was charged with payment
of the mortgage note out of trust income. The issue was whether the income so used was
for the benefit of the settlor.
108. By pecuniary benefit, the court meant that the payment would increase the
amount of money the settlor had or decrease the obligations for which the settlor would
have to use her money. The court noted that: "The payment of the mortgage debts resulted
in pecuniary benefit to trust alone, in that the net worth of the land was increased
to the extent of the payments made. There was no legal obligation upon the decedent to
discharge this debt except in case of a deficiency being due after there had been a sale
of the land upon foreclosure of the mortgage." 181 F.2d at 171, 51-1 U.S.T.C. 10,762, at
72,929.
109. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §811(c) (now INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, §2036(a)(1)). The
section provides that trust property is included within the gross *estate of the settlor
if the settlor retains an income interest "for his life . . . or for any period which
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issues appear to be the same, the estate tax law has no comparable attribution
provision. Thus, Hays' Estate is arguably not in conflict with Blumenthal.
While the Hays' Estate court did not explicitly refer to the assumption of
the debt as a retained-income interest by the grantor, it is implicit in the
decision that the assumption was deemed consideration for the transfer.
In Edwards v. Greenwald,110 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals extended
Hays' Estate to income tax cases. The court correctly distinguished Willcutts
and Blumenthal, noting that the instant taxpayer received no personal benefit
from the debt but rather acted merely as a surety for the trust. The court
stressed that:
[I]n the instant case the indebtedness of the trustees individually was
incurred contemporaneously with the establishment of the trusts and
was incurred solely for accommodation of the trust.1 '
Unfortunately, however, by citing Hays' Estate to fortify the holding in
Greenwald,l 2 the Fifth Circuit indicated that Hays' Estate was applicable
to an income tax situation. The settlor in Hays' Estate was not a mere surety
but had received personal benefit from the loan and should have been taxed
for the income used to pay the debt; the taxpayer in Greenwald, however,
was a mere surety. Even if a trust has sufficient income to pay the debt and
sufficient property to secure the debt (so that the settlor will never be
personally called upon to pay anything), this does not necessarily mean
that the settlor did not intend to retain an income interest sufficient to pay
his debt. Hays" Estate held to the contrary, however, and the Hays' Estate

does not in fact end before his death." Id. Thus, the issue involved was whether there
was a retained interest in the settlor; this issue should not depend on whether the case
involves an estate tax or income tax, although some issues framed in the same language
(such as whether there was consideration for a transfer) will depend on the particular
tax context.
110. 217 F.2d 632, 55-1 U.S.T.C. 19114 (5th Cir. 1954). The Dannenberg Co., a
corporation operating a retail dry goods and department store, owned a one-half interest
in a wholesale dry goods business known as Dannenberg-Greenwald. Pursuant to appropriate
corporate authorization, the corporation sold to the taxpayer, Mrs. Dorothy Dannenberg
Greenwald, a $30,000 interest in the Dannenberg-Greenwald partnership in consideration
for a $30,000 personal note payable on demand and bearing 5% interest per year. Mrs.
Greenwald placed her interest in the partnership in three separate trusts for her three
minor children. Those three trusts and three other trusts created in a similar manner by
another taxpayer conveyed their interests to a new limited partnership also known as
Dannenberg-Greenwald. The certificates of interest in the new partnership were assigned
to the Dannenberg Co. as security for payment of the notes. The company reserved the
right to sell the certificates and partnership interest it represented and to apply the
proceeds to the liquidation of the debt if the debt and interest failed to be paid on
demand. The conveyances to the trusts were expressly made subject to the contract
between the Dannenberg Co. and the settlor, and the trusts agreed to assume their
portion of the debt. In no event was the settlor to have any other interest in the assets
or income of the trust. The Commissioner determined deficiencies as a result of attributing
the trust income to the settlor. Id. at 632-33, 55-1 U.S.T.C. %9114, at 54, 136-37.
111. Id. at 635, 55-I U.S.T.C. 9114, at 54,138.
112. Id. at 636, 55-1 U.S.T.C. %9114, at 54,138.
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rationale, first employed in Greenwald, has continued to evince some vitality
11 3
in an income tax context.
It has been noted that a finding that the assumption of the donor's
obligation by the donee is a retained interest is inconsistent with a finding
that the assumption of the obligation is consideration for the transfer. 1 4 Since
these two theories have different income tax consequences, their application
should be based on the substance of the transaction rather than the taxpayer's
l
characterization of the transaction.1 15 The taxpayer in Staley v. Commissioner"G
attempted to avoid the tax consequences of a retained-income interest by
designating the interest as consideration for the transfer. He obtained the
funds to pay his gift tax by having the trust pay him trust income equal to
the gift tax and designating the payments as consideration for the transfer.
The court found, however, that the circumstances indicated that he had
retained an income interest.
It is elementary that artificial language in an instrument of conveyance does not suffice to alter the tax significance of the substance of
the transaction. The realities of this arrangement are not difficult to
ascertain. This was no sale for an inadequate consideration; it was
intended to be, and actually was, a gift of the entire corpus and all
the income
except an amount necessary to assist in paying the gift
11 7
taxes.
The holding in Staley is not inconsistent with a finding that if the corpus is
sold or mortgaged to pay the settlor's debt, the settlor has received consideration for the transfer consisting of either the entire gift or the retained interest. 18 This court merely looked to the circumstances of the transaction
and to the intent of the parties and found the settlor had retained an income
interest in the property.
The preceding discussion has dealt with the assumption by the donee of
an obligation of the donor. If, however, the gift property transferred is
subject to a liability for which the settlor was never personally liable, the
settlor should not be taxed on trust income used to pay the liability."1 9 The
reasoning of Greenwald is appropriate here. Since the settlor never benefits
from the proceeds of the encumbrance on the property, he should not be
taxed on the income used to satisfy it. Failure to tax the settlor in these
circumstances should not, however, preclude application of the Crane doctrine, 2 0 by which the taxpayer realizes a gain on the gratuitous transfer.
113. See Jack Wiles, 59 T.C. 287 (1972).
114. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
115. The intent of the donor and the donee should be considered, but merely
characterizing the obligation as consideration or a retained interest should not be determinative.
116. 136 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1943).
117. Id. at 369, 370 (emphasis added).
118. For discussion of consequences of the timing of the consideration, see note 92
supra.

119. Cf. Jack Wiles, 59 T.C. 287 (1972) (dicta).
120. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 47-1 U.S.T.C. 9217 (1946) held that the
amount realized on a transfer included the amount of the liability to which the property
was subject, even though the debt bad not been incurred by the transferor.
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Under Crane, the liability to which the property is subject must be included
as an amount realized on the transfer irrespective of the absence of liability
on the part of the transferor.

121

Gift Property Income Used to Pay Gift Tax
Although the gift tax is simply another type of liability, one for which
the donor is primarily liable, some courts have differentiated between this
obligation and others. 122 The first in the line of cases on this subject is
Estate of Sheaffer v. Commissioner.-' The trust instrument permitted the
trustee to apply trust income to the payment of the settlor's gift tax or other
taxes. The trustee, a non-adverse party,124 did apply income of the trust to the
payment of the settlor's gift tax. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's
holding that section 677125 was applicable and attributed to the settlor the
126
trust income used to pay the debt.
Sheaffer I was soon followed by Estate of Annette S. Morgan,127 an extension
of David Keith.128 The taxpayer in Morgan transferred property on condition
that the trust pay the gift tax. The trustee, who could have obtained the
funds by either selling or borrowing against the corpus, chose the latter. The
Commissioner argued that Keith, which had been limited by Revenue Ruling
57-564,129 was not controlling if the form of the debt was merely changed
from one owed by the settlor to one owed by the trust. The Commissioner
further contended that the income of the trust was in effect being used to
satisfy a debt of the donor. The Morgan court rejected the Commissioner's
argument. Relying on Keith, the court held that after the donor's debt was
paid, even though the trust acquired another liability, the income from the
gift property was not attributable to the donor. 30° The court distinguished

121. Id. See text accompanying notes 146-148 infra.
122. Compare Richard H. Turner, 49 T.C. 356 (1968) with Johnson v. Commissioner,
495 F.2d 1079, 74-1 U.S.T.C. 9355 (6th Cir. 1973).

123. 313 F.2d 738, 63-1 U.S.T.C.

9272 (Sth Cir. 1963).

124. Section 677 attributes income to the grantor if the income may be used for
him at his discretion or the dicretion of a nonadverse party. See note 77 supra.
125. INT. REv. CODE or 1954, §677.
126. 313 F.2d at 740-41, 63-1 U.S.T.C. 9272, at 87,641-42.
127. 37 T.C. 981 (1962), aff'd, 316 F.2d 238, 63-1 U.S.T.C. 9401 (6th Cir. 1963). In
Morgan the taxpayer transferred stock to a trust. The trust instrument provided that
the trust should pay the gift tax. The trustees were empowered to obtain the funds
to pay the tax by either selling trust stock or obtaining a loan with the trust as collateral.
The trustees obtained a loan and paid the gift taxes. The taxpayer was never liable for
the loan, and she did not receive any benefit from borrowing rather than selling a part
of the corpus to pay the gift tax. Id.
128. 45 B.T.A. 644 (1941), acquiesced in, 1942-1 CuM. BULL. 10. See text accompanying
notes 93-95 supra.
129. Rev. Rul. 57-564, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 328. The Keith court had held that when
corpus was sold to pay an obligation of the settlor, income retained to replenish the
corpus was not attributable to the settlor. Revenue Ruling 57-564 tried to limit Keith by
stating that if money was borrowed to pay the debt, income used to repay the loan was
attributable to the donor. Id.
130. 37 T.C. at 985.
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Russell'3 on the grounds that the "loan" extinguishing the debt in that case
was not an arm's length transaction with an independent party but was
in essence a sham transaction with the sole purpose of avoiding the adverse
tax consequences. While not specifically referring to the satisfaction of the
debt as consideration for the transfer, the Morgan court did state that the
payment of the debt was a benefit to the settlor.13 2 Thus, the satisfaction of
a debt of the settlor is consideration for the transfer when it is inappropriate
to attribute the trust income to the settlor.
Estate of Craig B. Sheaffer33 concerned transactions by the same parties
involved in Sheaffer I during different taxable years. In this case the court
rejected arguments by both the taxpayer and the Commissioner that Sheaffer I
and Morgan were inconsistent. The court held that if the donor's debt
was satisfied in a prior year through the borrowing of funds, trust income
realized after the satisfaction of the debt was not attributable to the donor;
but if the trust became responsible for a new debt of the donor (in this
case a gift tax deficiency), the trust income that was or could be used to pay
such a debt was attributable to the donor.134
The first case to differentiate between gift taxes and other liabilities was
Richard H. Turner.35 The Tax Court in Turner found that if a donee
agreed to pay the gift tax, the donor could only have intended a "net gift,"
i.e., the donor retained an interest in the transferred property to the extent
of the gift tax, and under no circumstances could the acceptance of the
liability constitute consideration for the transfer. 36 In earlier cases courts had
not differentiated between types of liabilities assumed nor had these courts
held that the assumption of a liability could not be consideration for the
transfer rather than a retained interest in the property. The failure of the
Turner court to accept the argument that the donor recognized a gain on a
part-sale and part-gift transaction may be due to the Commissioner's continued attempt to attribute income under section 677 whenever possible,
so. that the character of the income is generally ordinary and the amount of
the income is the entire amount of the liability. This approach suggests a
judicial conviction that section 677 is the only way for a settlor to recognize
income upon a transfer to a trust.
The tendency to overemphasize section 677 is discernible in the postTurner decision of Victor W. Krause.'3 7 The Krause court relied exclusively
131. See text accompanying notes 97-102 supra.
132. Id. at 985. The Tax Court noted that: "Her gift tax obligation was paid when

due and that is the sole benefit she would have received no matter what method had been
chosen by the trustees to obtain funds for this purpose." Id. (emphasis added).
133. 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 27,983 (1966).

134. Id. at 651-52.
135. See text accompanying notes 154-162 infra for a discussion of this case regarding

recognition of a gain on a gift transfer.
136. 49 T.C. at 362-64.
137. 56 T.C. 1242 (1971). The settlor transferred property to three trusts agreeing
that the trusts were to pay gift 'taxes. The trustees pledged trust corpus to obtain loans
to pay the taxes. The taxes were paid after some trust income was earned, although
none of the trust income was used to pay the taxes.
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upon section 677 to tax the settlor. The settlor had transferred appreciated
property to a trust under an agreement that the trust was to pay the
gift tax. Although some trust income that could have been used to pay the
taxes had been earned, the taxes were paid by the trust from the proceeds
of a loan. The Tax Court extended Morgan and held that only income received by the trust during the taxable year and before the date the donor's
debt is paid is attributable to the donor."38
The Commissioner presented alternative arguments. First, he proposed that
if the trust income was not attributable to the donor, then the payment of
the gift tax by the trust must have been either consideration for the transfer or
consideration for the donor's retained interest.' 9 The argument has considerable merit. An agreement to pay the debt should be deemed either
consideration or a retained interest by the transferor. The Krause court held
that Turner precluded a finding that the agreement to pay the gift tax was
consideration.140 The Commissioner next contended that payment of the gift
tax with borrowed funds was a liquidation of the donor's retained interest
on which the donor must recognize a gain to the extent that the gift tax
exceeded his basis in the retained interest. The court rejected this argument
in the following manner:
Contrary to respondent's contention, payment of the gift taxes
with borrowed funds did not constitute a purchase or liquidation of
income interests retained by petitioner. His retained interests were
not limited to the right to have the trust income applied toward the
payment of the gift taxes. He had the right to have the gift taxes paid
out of any available funds, whether borrowed, obtained from corpus, or
derived from dividends on the transferred stock. In a very real sense,
his gifts in trust consisted of only the
excess of the value of the stock
14
over the amount of the gift taxes. '
138.

The Sheaffer II court had held: "If a taxpayer is found to be a substantial owner

of a portion of a trust under the provisions of section 671 through 677, then he is
taxable on all the income oE such portion during the entire taxable year in issue."
Estate of Craig R. Sheaffer, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. %27,983, at 652 (1966). Morgan could
be interpreted as merely protecting the donor from attribution of income for years
following the payment of the debt. Sheaffer II held the trust income for the entire year
in which the debt was paid attributable to the donor.
Nevertheless, §677 may reasonably be interpreted, as it was by the Krause court, to
impute income received prior to the payment of the debt but not income earned after
the debt was paid within the same taxable year. The theory in Krause is that only
income received before the settlor is divested of his right to trust income (by the satisfaction of his debt for which trust income may be used) may be distributed to him. Later
income may not be distributed to him since he no longer has a right to it; therefore,
the later income is not attributable to him under §671. Thus, the Commissioner's reliance
on §677 in Krause was not completely tenable.
139. 56 T.C. at 1248.
140. Id. The Krause court also relied on the gift tax case of Sarah H. Harrison,
17 T.C. 1350 (1950), acquiesced in, 1952-2 CuM. BULL. 2, which did consider the donee's
obligation to pay gift taxes to be a retained interest by the donor. The same result
would have been reached, however, had that court found the obligation to pay to be
consideration; the statement that it was a retained interest is thus mere dicta. See text
accompanying notes 53-54 supra.
141. 56 T.C. at 1248.
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This response does not answer the Commissioner's argument. Admitting that
the donor has a retained interest in the gift property does not justify nonrecognition of gain on the sale of his retained interest. Apart from extending
Morgan, the Krause decision is evidently based on questionable authority.
Gain Realized on the GratuitousTransfer
A transfer that is a gift for gift tax purposes' 2 does not necessarily mean
that the donor will not recognize a gain on the transaction. A transfer for
consideration less than the value of the transferred property is a gift for
gift tax purposes. If, however, the consideration exceeds the donor's basis
in the transferred property, there is a part-sale and part-gift transaction for
43
income tax purposes, and the donor must recognize a gain on the transfer.
Furthermore, the taxpayer's characterization of the transfer as a gift is not
determinative if consideration is found for the transfer.-"
The concept of consideration is broader for income tax purposes than for
gift tax purposes. 45 Under the doctrine of Crane v. Commissioner,-46 the
142. A transfer that is a gift for gift tax purposes need not be a gift for income
tax purposes. A gift for income tax purposes must be a transfer with donative intent. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 60-2 U.S.T.C. 19515 (1960). To have a gift for
gift tax purposes, there is no need to show donative intent. But cf. TREAs. REG. §20.2011-8.
143. The amount of gain on a part-sale, part-gift transaction is explained in TRxAS.
REG. §1.1001-1(e). That regulation states in part: "Example (.) A transfers property
to his son for $60,000. Such property in the hands of A has an adjusted basis of $30,000
(and a fair market value of $90,000). A's gain is $30,000, the excess of $60,000, the amount
realized, over the adjusted basis, $30,000. He has made a gift of $30,000, the excess of
$90,000, the fair market value, over the amount realized, $60,000."
144. First Nat'l Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 404 F.2d 1182, 69-1 U.S.T.C. 9145 (6th
Cir. 1968).
145. For discussion of the gift tax concept of consideration, see note 31 supra and
accompanying text. Since the concept of gift is broader for gift tax purposes than for
income tax purposes and the concept of consideration is somewhat narrower for gift tax
purposes than for income tax purposes, it might be expected that a transaction that is
a gift for gift tax purposes might produce a gain for income tax purposes. This result will
depend on whether that income tax consideration exceeds the adjusted basis.
146. 331 U.S. 1, 47-1 U.S.T.C. 9217 (1946). The taxpayer had inherited a building
that had an estate tax value of $262,045.50. The building, however, was subject to a debt
consisting of $255,000 principal and $7,042.50 in unpaid interest that was equal to the
estate tax value. Several years later the arrearage of interest had increased the debt to
which the property was subject to $270,857.71. During that period, the taxpayer had
taken depreciation deductions totaling $28,045.10. The taxpayer sold the building for
$3,000 cash and after deducting $500 selling expenses reported a long-term capital gain
of $2,500, the amount realized less the zero basis. The Commissioner disputed this,
computing the amount realized to be the $2,500 net cash plus the principal amount of
the mortgage of $255,000 for a total amount realized of $257,500. The unpaid interest
was not part of the amount realized since it was a deductible expense. The stepped-up basis
was computed to be $55,000 on the land and $207,042.50 on the building. The $28,045.10
depreciation taken reduced the building's basis to $178,997.40. The amount realized was
allocated $54,471.15 to the land and $203,028.85 to the building. The taxpayer therefore
had a gain of $24,031.45 on the building, which the Commissioner determined to be an
ordinary gain, and a $528.85 long term capital loss on the land. The Supreme Court
sustained the Commissioner's position. Id.
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amount realized from a sale or other taxable transfer includes the amount
of any liabilities to which the transferred property is subject. This is true
even if the transferor is not personally liable for such liabilities. 14 7 If a
transfer is made subject to a liability less than the fair market value of the
property, but no other consideration is involved, the transfer is a gift for
gift tax purposes since the fair market value is greater than the liability.
The transfer, however, may nevertheless produce a taxable gain if the liability
4 8
exceeds the adjusted basis in the transferred property.
As discussed previously, if a gift is made to a trust subject to a liability
the proceeds of which have benefited the donor and the income of the
trust can be used to repay the liability, such income is attributable to the
donor under section 677. If, however, a liability is assumed by the donee
in conjunction with the gift, and the liability is wholly or partly satisfied
with funds other than income attributable to the donor, the donor should be
deemed to have received consideration in an amount equal to the liability
less any part of the liability paid with income attributable to him. This is
the proper result even if the donor has never been personally liable. 14 In
Malone v. United States, 50 the donor's debt was assumed by the trust to
which the taxpayer transferred property. The debt was paid out of trust
income. The Malone court agreed with the Commissioner's contention that
the donor had realized a gain to the extent that the assumed debt exceeded his
basis.' 5' The Commissioner did not argue the feasibility of applying section
677. The court, therefore, failed to consider the possibility that the donor

147. Id.
148. See Rev. Rul. 70-626, 1970-2 CuM. BULL. 158; Simon v. Commissioner, 285 F.2d 422,
61-1 U.S.T.C. 9136 (3d Cir. 1960).
149. Crane v. Commissioner, 931 U.S. 1, 47-1 U.S.T.C. 19217 (1946). If the consideration
is deemed to have been given at the time of the transfer, then the transfer is a part-sale,
part-gift transaction. But cf. text accompanying notes 139-140.
150. 326 F. Supp. 106, 71-1 (J.S.T.C. 9475 (N.D. Miss. 1971). The taxpayer had bought
some property in 1940 for $13,650. He mortgaged the property in 1956 for $21,000. In
1961, the first mortgage debt had been reduced to $16,000, and the taxpayer procured an
additional $16,000 from a second mortgage. The two loans were consolidated for payment
in 35 annual installments starting in January 1968. The proceeds of both loans were
used for his personal farm operations on other lands and for the purchase of farm
machinery. Prior to the date of the first payment the taxpayer established a trust
for the benefit of his minor children. The trust assumed primary responsibility for the
two mortgages, and trust income was to be used to repay the loans.
151. 326 F. Supp. at 111, 71-1 U.S.T.C. 9475, at 86,699. The Commissioner appeared
to accept the Hays' Estate and Greenwald rationale, at least in this case. The Commissioner
argued that under applicable Mississippi law, the debt had been assumed by the trust,
and the settlor had become a mere surety. In Greenwald, the decision that §677 did not
apply was probably correct since the debt was incurred for the accommodation of the
trust. See text accompanying note 113 supra. In the instant case, however, the debt
was for the benefit of the settlor and not the trust. The Malone decision, therefore,
illustrates the Commissioner's position that whenever the settlor becomes a mere surety
for a loan §677 does not apply. The Commissioner in Malone did, however, successfully
contend that where the assumption of a debt is not covered by §677, then the assumption
must be consideration for the transfer.
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had assumed the role of a surety and thus failed to expand the rationale
52
of Hays! Estate and Greenwald.2
While offering no rationale for differentiating between gift tax and other
liabilities, courts have universally held that if the gift tax is the liability
to be paid by the donee, the donor recognizes no gain on the transfer. 53 The
first case to so hold was Richard H. Turner.5 4 The Turner court held that
an agreement by a donee to pay the gift tax was a retained interest by the
donor and thus was a net gift.55 The court relied on both gift tax and
income tax cases. To a large extent, this reliance is misplaced. Whether the
donee's duty to pay the gift tax was deemed a retained interest by the donor
or consideration paid to the donor is irrelevant in the gift tax decisions.
Furthermore, the Turner court took the untenable position that the terms
"gift" and "consideration" are the same for both gift tax and income tax
purposes. 56 The income tax cases cited were all decided under section
677, which provides that under certain circumstances the settlor retains an
income interest in the trust. The cited cases merely held that the litigated
situations were within the statutory penumbra. They do not stand for the
proposition that if the situation falls outside the bounds of section 677, pay57
ment of the donor's liability is not consideration for the transfer.
The Turner court quoted Morgan 58 to support its view that after satisfaction of the donor's debt, there is no theory available to attribute income of
the trust to the donor. 55 That statement, however, does not preclude a finding
that the satisfaction of the debt by sale of the trust corpus or by borrowing
against the trust corpus cannot be consideration for the transfer or, alter152. The Malone court did in fact find that the donor had become a surety for the
debt and cited Hays' Estate as authority. 326 F. Supp. at 111, 71-1 US.T.C. 9475, at
86,698-99.
153.. Edna Bennett Hirst, 63 T.C. 309 (1974); Estate of Kenneth W. Davis, 30 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. f31,120 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 469 F.2d 694, 73-1 U.S.T.C. 9124 (5th Cir.
1972); Victor W. Krause, 56 T.C. 1242 (1971); Richard H. Turner, 49 T.C. 356 (1968).
But cf. Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 74-1 U.S.T.C. 9355 (1974).
154. 49 T.C. 356 (1968). The donor had acquired some stock in 1913. By 1960 the
stock had substantially appreciated. The donor made gifts of the stock, but she required
the donees to pay the gift tax. The amount of the gift tax substantially exceeded the
donor's cost basis in the stock. Id.
155. Id. at 363.
156. The reliance on gift tax cases by the Turner court weakens its holding. A finding
in a gift tax case that the donor retains an interest in the gift property is mere dicta
since a finding that the donor received consideration for the transfer would have had
the same gift tax result. See note 140 supra. A transfer that is a gift for gift tax purposes
need not be a transfer with donative intent, a fact that the Turner court probably assumed
when it said that: "In all of. the above cases, both in a gift tax and income tax context,
the major premise of each decision is that a condition imposed by the transferor that the
transferee will pay the gift tax resulting therefrom does not alter the result that the
transfer constituted a gift." 49. T.C. at 362. See notes 142-143 supra and accompanying text.
157. If the grantor has retained an interest, payment of the debt should be considered
a liquidation of the retained interest, as argued by the Commissioner in Victor W. Krause,

56 T.C. 1242 (1971).
158. See note 127 supra and accompanying text for a. discussion of the case.
159. 49 T.C. at 862.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol28/iss3/4

24

Green: Tax Consequences of Gifts Given with Strings Attached
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVIII

natively, a liquidation of the donor's retained interest. The Tax Court in
Victor W. Krause160 followed the Turner decision in finding that there
could be no gain on the transfer since under Turner the transaction was
a net gift rather than a part-sale and part-gift, and the donor therefore
retained an interest in the property rather than received consideration for
the transfer. Krause, however, extended Turner by holding that there was
no gain even under a liquidation theory of the retained interest. 161 Turner
and Krause have been followed by other courts when the liability assumed
was also the gift tax liability.

62

The recent decision of Johnson v. Commissioner,'6 however, casts doubt
on the continued viability of the Turner doctrine. The donor in Johnson
borrowed against greatly appreciated property before transferring the property
by gift. Most of the proceeds of the loan were used to pay his gift tax.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals limited Turner to its particular facts
and indicated that the case had no precedential value.164 In Johnson the court
held that the settlor realized gain on a transfer when he transferred property
subject to a liability greater than his basis in the property,' 65 even when the
debt incurred was for the purpose of paying the gift taxes. The court noted
that:
[W]e find no basis whatsoever in the provisions of the Code for taxpayer's assertion that a donee's discharge of a donor's gift tax liability
does not constitute the realization of income if a donee's tax attorneys
structure the transaction in a certain manner. 66
In Johnson the liability involved was a loan rather than the gift tax, but
the court's reasoning is nevertheless sound and should be applied in gift
tax cases.
The most recent decision in this area is the Tax Court's decision in Edna
Bennett Hirst.167 Despite the sound reasoning in Johnson, the Hirst court
160.
supra.

56 T.C. 1242 (1971). See notes 137-138 supra and text accompanying notes 137-141

161. See notes 139-141 supra and accompanying text.
162. Edna Bennett Hirst, 63 T.C. 309 (1974) (court admitted the illogic of Turner
but felt bound by precedent); Estate of Kenneth W. Davis, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
31,120 (1971) (court reaffirmed the authority of Turner and Krause).
163. 495 F.2d 1079, 74-1 U.S.T.C. 9355 (6th Cir. 1973), afl'g 59 T.C. 791 (1972).
164. 495 F.2d at 1086, 74-1 U.S.T.C. 9355, at 83,822.
165. Id. at 1084-85, 74-1 U.S.T.C. 9355, at 83,820-21.
166. Id. at 1084, 74-1 U.S.T.C. 9355, at 83,820.
167. 63 T.C. 307 (1974) (on appeal by the government to the 4th Circuit Court of
Appeal). The taxpayer owned a one-half interest in three tracts of land. The tracts
had substantially appreciated but were not income producing. Furthermore, the taxpayer
lacked sufficient liquid assets to pay the real estate taxes each year. To eliminate
the real estate tax burden and to benefit the natural object of her bounty, the taxpayer
decided to give the tracts to her only child and his family. Her son agreed to pay the
substantial gift tax because of her limited liquid assets. She made gifts of various
interests in the three tracts to her son, to her son's wife, to her two adult grandchildren,
and to her son as trustee for the minor grandchild. The Commissioner determined that
she realized a gain to the extent that her state and federal gift taxes of $85,469,55, paid
by her son, exceeded her adjusted basis in the tracts of $8,377,00,
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felt bound to follow Turner and the weight of authority. The court did point
out, however, the fallacy of the Turner position - since there was a finding
of a net gift, the donor had no gain on the transfer.
We recognize that there is much force to the Government's position.
The gift tax itself is imposed only upon the "net gift"; i.e., upon the
gross amount of the property transferred minus the gift tax paid by
the donee. In substance, a portion of the transferred property equal
in value to the amount of the gift tax is not treated as having been
part of the gift. But surely that portion did not vanish into thin air,
and a strong argument can be advanced for the conclusion that it was
exchanged for the donee's payment of the gift tax on the "net gift,"
a transaction that may result in the realization of gain or loss depending
upon the donor's basis in the property ....
[Tjhere may be much to
be said in favor of a more "realistic" approach to the problem. Things
have gone
too far by now to wipe the slate dean and start all over
168
again.

In summary, the Malone and Johnson cases indicate that the assumption
of a liability by the donee of a gift, to the extent income is not attributed
to the donor, is consideration for the transfer and may result in the donor's
recognition of a gain on the transfer if the consideration exceeds his basis.
If the liability in question is the gift tax, however, under Turner, no gain
need be recognized.
CONCLUSION

A gift for gift tax purposes is the total value of the property transferred
less the liability assumed. For gift tax purposes, it is irrelevant whether the
assumption of the liability is considered a retained interest, or consideration,
or any other diminution in the value of the gift. For income tax purposes it
does matter how the assumption of the liability is characterized. If the donor
is considered to have retained an interest by not having given the entire
property to the donee, then income produced by the gift property may be
attributable to him. On the other hand, if the assumption of the liability is
deemed consideration, the transaction is a part-sale and part-gift transaction
on which the donor will realize a gain if the liability assumed exceeds his
adjusted basis in the "gift" property even if the donor has never been
personally liable for the debt. A third way of characterizing the liability is
theoretically sound but has had little, if any, judicial support. The donor is
viewed as having a retained interest in the property that he "sells" or
"liquidates" by having the donee satisfy the obligation. He would therefore
recognize a gain to the extent that the amount of the debt satisfied exceeds
his adjusted basis in the retained interest.169
RICHARD D. GREEN
168. Id. at 315.
169. A suggested method of computing his basis in the retained interest is to use the
same method used to compute the basis of the portion "sold" in a "bargain sale" to a
charity. See note 92 supra and notes 66-68 supra and accompanying text.
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